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CONFIDENTIAL

Due c. 1 Aug.
Reinstated
Orig. delivered to [REDACTED] 25X1A
(B/EE via D/SE) for
copying 25 Aug.
Orig. returned to B/EE 30 Aug.

26 July 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM TO: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Finnish Political Situation and Finnish
Political Parties

1. It would be helpful to me to have a summary analytical treatment of this subject including the character of the parties other than the Communist party with respect to their

a. degree of opposition to the Communist party;

b. ability to oppose the Communist party including financial and other support resources and organizational effectivity;

c. Totalitarian tendencies--both "left" and "right" propensities.

2. This information is needed as soon as possible and I wonder if this report could be ready by the end of this week or the beginning of next.

25X1A
[REDACTED]

I think this has already
been acted on long since --
not sure --
REL
26 Aug

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Project IP 12

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

12 Sept.

(To [REDACTED])

25X1A

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 8 August 1949

To: B/EE (Intelligence Control)
From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning
Subject: Communist Financial Activities

Statement of Project

Origin: G/SI

Problem: To provide the information requested on the attached sheet

Assumptions:

Issues:

Classification to be no higher than: Confidential

Form: Working paper; not for dissemination

Date: To G/SI by 29 August

Branch responsibilities: B/EE (World Communist Committee) to prepare report

Departmental responsibilities: None

Recommended Dissemination:

25X1A

4 August 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

SUBJECT : Financial and other support of Communist activities and efforts outside the USSR

1. The Communists' activities outside the USSR are of a character indicating prodigal expenditures of funds and other means of support; especially by our standards of supporting a comparable effort with our methods of doing things. Examples are demonstrations; celebrations; rallies; preparation and distribution of books, pamphlets, newspapers and posters; "Tammany-type" political relief and individual aid at the "grass roots" level of politics.

2. Would it be possible to answer the following questions:

a. To what extent the aforementioned efforts outside the USSR are financed by exports of gold or other goods and services (or USSR purchases of foreign exchange)?

b. To what extent are these efforts supported by funds and resources assembled from non-USSR sources?

c. What are the methods by which the latter is accomplished?

3. Although my office is interested in answers to the above questions on a world wide basis, we will be especially interested with reference to support of Communists in Finland, France, Italy, Mexico, Japan, and Indonesia.

25X1A


Due Date: 1 Sept 49

*Coordinate: Treasury / International Monetary
F.B.I. D.V.*

Case No. 247

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IP-13

10 August 1949

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Staff Intelligence Group, ORE

REFERENCE : Conversation of 8 August 1949 between
25X1A [REDACTED]

1. In view of the increasing importance to the West of forced labor conditions in the Soviet Union, it is requested that a study be prepared showing the location, size, and character of such camps. It is desired that the study be prepared from the viewpoint of possible use of such camps as centers of revolt and resistance in time of war.

2. Apparently these camps have not previously been considered as intelligence targets and doubtless there is relevant material yet to be gathered to CIA files. I refer especially to material believed to be in the Hoover War Library, Stanford University.

3. My office is ready to lend a full-time researcher to assist in the preparation of this report if needed.

4. May I hear from you at your early convenience as to a prospective date when this report may be ready?

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Support Officer, OPC

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UNCLASSIFIED		RESTRICTED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">IP-13</div> <div> CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP </div> </div>							
TO		INITIALS	DATE				
1	Chief, G/SP-OLE	REL	15 Aug				
2	B/EE	APR					
3							
4							
5							
FROM		INITIALS	DATE				
1	[REDACTED] o/c						
2	25X1A						
3							
<div style="display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr); gap: 5px;"> <div><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div>							
REMARKS: 25X1A <div style="font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;"> Have talked with [REDACTED] please [REDACTED] o/c requests hereafter take up [REDACTED] (B) with [REDACTED] </div>							
25X1A							

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1A
TO [REDACTED]
FROM [REDACTED] Intelligence Support Officer
[REDACTED] D/Pub
25X1A
SUBJECT: Cancellation of request

DATE: 8 December 49

1. This will confirm our conversation of this date in which we agreed to cancel your request of 10 August addressed to Chief, Staff Intelligence Group, ORE.

2. It is our understanding that if at a future date you wish to reopen this case, you will do so in a new memorandum of request.

Reference to IP-13

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project IP-14

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 22 Aug 49

To: B/WE, Chief

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning *REL*

Subject: Condition of anti-communist unions in Berlin

Statement of Project

Origin: Internal project

Problem: To report actual conditions of anti-communist unions in Berlin

Assumptions:

Scope: It is desired to know also exact relationship of Western Powers' military governments to them, particularly in reference to any attempts to bolster the unions.

Classification to be no higher than: T.S.

Form: IP-14: brief, uncoordinated report

Dates: To G/SI by close of business, 24 August.

Branch responsibilities: B/WE to prepare report

Departmental responsibilities: None

Recommended Dissemination: limited

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(Use verso of this sheet for other matter)

IP-IX

SECRET

19 August 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Condition of Anti-Communist Unions
in Berlin.

1. An article appearing in The New York Times on 6 August stated that the federation of anti-Communist independent trade unions of Berlin (UGO) is dangerously near financial collapse. The article further states that UGO's activities are the only genuine labor union efforts being made in Berlin and the only free union activities going on in open view of German workers living under Soviet control.

2. Would it be possible to obtain full information as to the actual condition of these unions? What is the exact relationship of the Western Powers' military governments to them, particularly in reference to any attempts to bolster the unions?

3. There is great need to have whatever information is available. Could this be supplied on or before 25 August?

25X1A

Refer Case 281-R

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TO: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning

FROM: Acting Chief, B/WE

SUBJECT: Anti-Communist Unions in Berlin

No specific answers can be given to the queries regarding (a) the relationships existing between the unions and the western power military governments, (b) attempts by the western powers to assist the unions, or (c) the present financial condition of the union. This information on western power action and the financial situation of "friendly" foreign groups falls within the category generally considered policy or operational by the departmental agencies. As such, it is seldom forwarded to ORE. The degree of western power support in the form of guidance or tangible assistance can, therefore, only be surmised, although the information should be available from Berlin if needed for operational purposes.

Unabhängige Gewerkschaft Opposition (UGO) has become the central trade union organization for the unions operating in the western sectors of Berlin. The organization developed within the Communist-Controlled Free German Trade Union League (FDGB), and finally broke from the latter in the early summer of 1948. At this time, Communist or pro-Communist trade union elements remained within the Berlin branch of the FDGB. UGO represents and is led by the Socialists, who before 1933 controlled the greater part of the Berlin trade union movement. Because of the Socialist domination of UGO, it is presumed that British influence has been heavy and that the Ostbuero of the west German Socialist party has provided some tactical advice and financial assistance.

Although no specific information has become available, it is believed that UGO has been receiving funds from the military governments of the US and the UK, and from the Socialist party and the rank and file of the union. These sources are listed in what is believed to be the order of their importance. Recently the three western power commandants decided to cut emergency subsidies to Berlin political parties 50% for August, and to eliminate subsidies thereafter. This move will probably indirectly curtail the income of UGO, which is not expected to be able to obtain sufficient revenue locally.

UGO is generally anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, and is approximately as pro-US as is the Berlin Socialist party. UGO suffers from lack of capable leadership, which was embarrassed by the inconsistencies of western policy in the rail strike of May/June 1949. At present there are indications that another strike may occur, because of the failure of the Soviet-controlled Reichsbahn Administration to fulfill its obligations under the strike settlement.

UGO has been confused by vacillation in western power policy toward the unions. In the last rail strike, for example, the railway workers union apparently was encouraged directly and indirectly by local western officials to block Berlin rail

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
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transportation completely and to assume control of Reichsbahn property in the western sectors. As the strike began to pinch the western sectors, however, UGO was caused to accept a settlement which left many factors to the mercies of the Reichsbahn Administration. It is doubtful that UGO will be as receptive to US guidance as in the past.

In the event of further request by the source of this query, B/WE will repeat its previous requirements to the collection agencies and will seek specific data.

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IP-15

Request 19 Sept.

Rec'd 22 Sept.

Delivered 23 Sept.

STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Editorial Review

Project: IP-15

Received from: B/EE

Date: 22 September 1949

Priority:

Subject: Analysis of Soviet Propaganda about Yugoslavia and Tito
28 June 1948 - 12 September 1949

Reviewed in G/SI by: (1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

Returned to Branch: _____

Received in G/SI: _____

Date: 9/22

Approved by: Isaf (as IP)

Final Revision Approved by:

Date: _____

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TO: [REDACTED] OPC
 FROM: [REDACTED] NEM, ORE
 SUBJECT: Communist Literature in India

Received &
 Delivered
 9/26/49
 (by [REDACTED]) 25X1A

26 September, 1949

With reference to your inquiry regarding Communist literature in India, the several questions are answered seriatim:

a.) USIS stations in India are located at New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. These stations are well stocked, especially at Bombay. The latter station was the first one opened in India and is reported to be functioning in a highly satisfactory manner. The other stations are newer and have not yet been fully developed, due to space and personnel difficulties. It is anticipated, however, that they will shortly be stocked and equipped in the same satisfactory manner as that at Bombay.

b.) Pro-Communist literature is being distributed with intensity and apparently in accordance with plan throughout India. Pro-Communist books and pamphlets are on sale in all urban centers, and, even in the country, parts, pamphlets and hand bills are available. The appealing and clever format of these publications is especially noteworthy. Sale is obviously at lower than cost in most instances.

c.) The great mass of this literature is printed in India. It appears in English and in all of the important vernaculars. Publications in the latter appear invariably to be published in India, of the English language material, about 10% is published in England. No material has been noted which is published elsewhere.

The People's Publishing House, with branches throughout India, produces most of the material. Recent police action, especially in Bombay and Calcutta, has closed many of their presses and others have gone underground with accord-

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ingly a current diminution of output. This is, however, probably a temporary situation. Information showing the addresses of those presses now known to be operating is not available but if desired inquiry will be made of the field.

d.) There is a notable lack of anti-Communist books and pamphlets in India. Commercial distribution of material published in the US is impeded in several ways. Foremost is the lack of dollar exchange. Recent exchange control regulations prevent the importation of all printed material from hard currency areas other than "scientific and educational books". It is believed that by educational books is meant text books. Heretofore a small amount of exchange has been available for the purchase of American publications, but this has been apart by book dealers almost entirely upon the more disreputable type of American literature, magazines and books, which can be procured cheap and which have a rapid sale. Numerous comments have been received from Americans in India regarding the deplorable nature of American magazines and books seen on sale in the bazaars and book stalls. Crime and sex appear to be the exclusive coverage. Thus, a small amount of available exchange appears to work to the detriment rather than to the advantage of this country.

A second deterrent to the sale of American books in India is the matter of publishers' rights. Many of the American publishers sell their overseas or British Empire rights to UK publishers and, hence, could not supply books to the Indian trade even if exchange was available. The British publisher in many instances will not have produced the book at all or because of paper shortage will have produced it only in limited quantity with none available for Indian distribution.

The greatest deterrent ^{to} ~~for~~ the commercial distribution of anti-Communist material in India is, however, simply the lack of demand for that material as currently produced in the West. While this office is unaware of any books on the subject, written and published in the UK, which compare in readability

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to many of those published in the US, some material is undoubtedly published

there. There is no impediment to the entry into India of UK printed matter.

The Indian public, however, does not find anti-Communist publications of the
from the UK

type available sufficiently interesting to warrant their commercial importation;
nor would there be any great demand for even the best of the American anti-Communist books even if exchange restrictions and publishers' agreements were rescinded.

A few of the upper class intellectuals would buy them, but it is not thought that the sale would be sufficiently large to be of significance. This does not mean that the Indian reading public is disinclined to read anti-Communist books; it indicates only that the material as currently produced in the West is written in a manner devoid of appeal to all but a few Indians.

e.) The Situation described above is not being met adequately by present functions of the Department of State. This is due to the necessary limitations placed upon the activities of Department of State agencies, each USIS station being a constituent part of a diplomatic or consular office. The function of these stations is to disseminate pro-US material. This they do well and successfully. With slight exceptions, they can not properly overtly disseminate material attacking the philosophy of a government friendly, technically or actually, to the government in whose territory they are located; nor can they distribute material through commercial outlets which would involve the receipt of money.

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AD/ORE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project : IP-17

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date 26 Sept 49

To: B/FE

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning REL

Subject: Evaluation of address by Gideonse

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To evaluate the address: "American policy in Indonesia" by Harry D. Gideonse

Assumptions:

25X1A

Scope:

Note: [REDACTED] will be called for an answer to this query at noon tomorrow, and therefore the deadline is a positive one.

Classification to be no higher than: Confidential

Form: Special project; memorandum

Dates: To G/SI for transmittal by 1000 on 27 September

Branch responsibilities: B/FE to prepare requested memorandum

Departmental responsibilities: None

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 27 1949
AD-5-

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100010001-5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, G/SI

DATE: 27 September 1949

FROM : Chief, Far East Pacific Branch

SUBJECT: Reply to Request IP-17; To evaluate the address "American policy in Indonesia" by Dr. Harry D. Gideonse

The author has oversimplified the complex Indonesian problem. In addition, his factual bases are onesided and sometimes inaccurate. Therefore, his conclusions are debatable.

25X6

25X6

His praise of past Dutch educational successes appears unwarranted.

The appearance of a progressive transfer of self-government is misleading for in every instance the Dutch retained ultimate control. While it is undoubtedly true that many Indonesian leaders collaborated with the Japanese, it is somewhat logically claimed that they did so opportunistically in order to gain independence. The weaknesses of the Republic are undeniable, but it has never had a chance to grow and mature under normal conditions. The allegation that the Republic is infiltrated with Communists and the implication of Communist sympathies are unsubstantiated. The comments on Dr. Graham and criticism of UN politics seem immaterial to the issue.

25X6

Considerations of American policy are not within the scope of B/FE's assigned mission. However, when Dr. Gideonse criticizes our role as "ideological hypocrisy" and as being unrealistic, he ignores the fact that the Dutch have completely failed to reestablish a semblance of control or stability in the islands through their own efforts during the last four years. The US must consider this realistic fact.

Whether or not the Indonesians are capable of governing themselves, and this highly questionable, it is undeniable that the tide of nationalism has become such a powerful force in the Far East that the imposition of peaceful colonial regimes is no longer possible. Attempts to do so only result in overburdening expenditures to the metropolitan power and destruction of economic life and overall chaos in the colony.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project : IP-18

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 26 Sept 1949
~~22 Sept~~

To: B/FE

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning *CEL*

Subject: Gun running in the Far East

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To provide all available information on the subject

Assumptions:

Scope: ID 572604 of 27 June 1949 is attached; any additional information is urgently desired.

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Form: Memorandum

Date: To G/SI by 6 October 1949

Branch responsibilities: B/FE to prepare memorandum

Departmental responsibilities: None

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

SEP 27 1949
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Chief, Staff Intelligence Division

6 October 1949

Chief, Far East/Pacific Division

IP-18 Gun Running in the Far East

1. Extensive gun running in the Far East began shortly after the end of World War II. Arms movements appear to have been made by planes and small fast boats based very largely in the Philippines. Operations of individuals, rings, and companies form a complex pattern which has not yet been completely revealed. However, available evidence points to the following conclusions:

2. Judging from arms actually involved in arms smuggling, the following types of weapons are available:

- .30 Cal. Browning machine guns
- .45 cal. Submachine guns
- .45 cal. Colt automatics
- Browning automatic rifles
- M1 and M2 carbines
- .38 cal. Smith and Wesson police pistols

3. In general, arms are obtained from those supplied by the US to various resistance movements in the Far East during the war, from war surplus dumps, from commercial imports, and from official stocks. Perhaps the greatest sources are US war surplus dumps. For example, the province of Batangas, (south of Manila) was the location of a large US wartime supply base and is now a suspected source of considerable gun smuggling. An item dated 5 October states: "A surprise raid last night by Philippine Constabulary agents on an arsenal of a notorious arms smuggling syndicate in Batangas brought a rich haul. It included brand new machine guns, Thompson submachine guns, several anti-aircraft guns of small caliber, and parts of 37 mm. guns."

STATSPEC

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4. It is suspected that [redacted] are involved in gun smuggling. Indications are that many ex-US servicemen have also actively participated in procuring and transporting firearms illegally. In addition, various companies have engaged in illicit transactions involving arms. A special report on persons (believed to be US citizens) and companies operating from the Philippines is attached. Additional information is contained in reports listed in the attached annotated bibliography which is believed to contain the best available material on the subject.

5. The scope of gun smuggling operations probably extends to every point in the Far East where there is a market for firearms. The primary motive of the transactions appears to be to make quick, easy money.

25X1A

[redacted]
Captain, USN

Attachments (2)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1. AD/ORE	<i>[Signature]</i>	27 Sept
2. AD/ACE	<i>[Signature]</i>	
3. G/SI		
4.		
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FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1. G/SI	<i>[Signature]</i>	9-27-49
2.		
3.		

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS:

File in "Internal Projects"

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